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Attention research over the last several decades has provided rich insights into the deter-
minants of distraction, including distractor characteristics, task features, and individual
differences. Load Theory represented a particularly important breakthrough, highlighting
the critical role of the level and nature of task-load in determining both the efficiency of dis-
tractor rejection and the stage of processing at which this occurs. However, until recently
studies of distraction were restricted to those measuring rather specific forms of distrac-
tion by external stimuli which I argue that, although intended to be irrelevant, were in fact
task-relevant. In daily life, attention may be distracted by a wide range of stimuli, which may
often be entirely unrelated to any task being performed, and may include not only external
stimuli but also internally generated stimuli such as task-unrelated thoughts. This review
outlines recent research examining these more general, entirely task-irrelevant, forms of
distraction within the framework of Load Theory. I discuss the relation between different
forms of distraction, and the universality of load effects across different distractor types
and individuals.
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The experience of being unintentionally distracted from an
intended focus is likely to be frustratingly familiar to most peo-
ple, and such distraction can prove highly disruptive in a variety of
daily life contexts (e.g., education, Rabiner et al., 2004; in the work-
place, Wallace and Vodanovich, 2003; or while driving, Arthur and
Doverspike, 1992). Over the past decades a large body of research
has investigated the determinants of the ability to focus atten-
tion on relevant stimuli, while avoiding distraction from irrelevant
stimuli, highlighting a number of important factors. These include
features of the distractor such as visual salience or abrupt onset
in the display (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992; Yantis, 2000) and individ-
ual differences (e.g., in working memory capacity (WMC); Kane
and Engle, 2003). The level of perceptual load in a task has been
identified as a particularly powerful determinant of distraction:
according to the Load Theory (e.g., Lavie, 1995, 2005, 2010), irrel-
evant (and potentially distracting) stimuli can only be perceived if
there is sufficient spare perceptual capacity left over from task pro-
cessing. Distraction can therefore be reduced or altogether avoided
during more perceptually demanding tasks, which fully exhaust
perceptual capacity and so reduce or prevent distractor process-
ing. In contrast, tasks which impose only a low level of perceptual
load leave spare capacity, which allows processing of potentially
distracting non-task stimuli.
In support of Load Theory, increased perceptual load (in terms
of a greater number of task stimuli requiring processing, or more
complex perceptual task demands) has been found to reduce both
the visual-cortical response to irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Yi et al.,
2004; Schwartz et al., 2005), and a range of behavioral indices of
distractor processing including response-competition (e.g., Lavie,
1995; Lavie and Cox, 1997), negative priming (Lavie and Fox,
2000), and inattentional blindness (Cartwright-Finch and Lavie,
2007). However, as I shall discuss, until recently empirical studies
of perceptual load effects, and of distraction in general, were lim-
ited to those using external distractor stimuli that were in some
way relevant to the task being performed. Load Theory implies
that under low load even entirely task-irrelevant stimuli will be
processed and could potentially (providing that they are of suffi-
cient salience) cause distraction. Indeed, in daily life, people may
often be distracted by stimuli seemingly entirely unrelated to the
task that they are currently engaged in – for example a student may
be distracted from studying by the sight of a friend walking by. In
addition, task-irrelevant distractions may come not only from the
external environment but also from internally generated stimuli
associated with mind-wandering – for example, a student may be
distracted from reading an assigned article by the intrusion of a
thought about an unrelated issue – perhaps some salient recent
event in his or her daily life. In the following sections I consider
the extent to which both well established and more recent labora-
tory measures address the common daily life experience of entirely
task-irrelevant distraction (by both internal and external stimuli),
and discuss recent studies extending Load Theory to these forms
of distraction.
ESTABLISHED MEASURES OF DISTRACTION
A widely used measure of distraction is the response-competition
task (e.g., Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; see Figure 1A for exam-
ple). Within this task, participants are slowed in responding to
targets in the presence of response-incompatible versus response-
compatible distractors. In contrast to predecessors such as the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the target and distractors are presented
in spatially separate locations which are known to the partici-
pant. As the target location is known, participants have no reason
to search the distractor locations, making these locations entirely
irrelevant.
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FIGURE 1 | Measures of distractor interference: example displays.
(A)The response-competition-task. In this task participants make
forced-choice responses to a target item (in this example, either X or N).
Distraction is indexed by the RT increase when the target item is flanked by
distractors representing the competing response (pictured) versus those
representing the same response. (B)The attentional capture task. In the
typical attentional capture task, distraction is indexed by the increase in
search RTs for a target item (in this example a circle), when one of the
non-target search items appears as a salient singleton in an irrelevant
dimension (e.g., color), compared to a no singleton baseline. (C) A new
measure of interference from salient yet entirely task-irrelevant distractors.
Within these measures distraction is indexed by the increase in RTs
associated with the peripheral presentation of a colorful distractor. This can be
either an image of a well known cartoon character (selected from Superman,
Spiderman, Pikachu, Spongebob Squarepants, Micky Mouse, and Donald
Duck) or meaningless yet colorful shape.
In this way the response-competition task appears to reflect
situations in daily life in which an individual is distracted by a
stimulus appearing in an unattended location. However, although
the location is irrelevant, the identity of response-competition dis-
tractors is highly relevant to the task. In the most typical versions
of the task the distractor stimuli are of the same type as target (e.g.,
both are letters), although some versions of the task use different
stimulus types (e.g., pictures versus names) as target and distractor
(e.g., Young et al., 1986). Nevertheless, by the very nature of the
response-competition task all variants of this task have in com-
mon a strong response-relevance born by the distractor to the
target. Interestingly, it has been demonstrated that the expected
locations of response-competition distractors in fact appear to
receive advance attentional allocation (resulting in speeded per-
ception of other stimuli appearing in these locations, Tsal and
Makovski, 2006). In these respects, the response-competition task
differs somewhat from the kind of interference often experienced
in daily life, from a distractor (e.g., a friend walking past) that is
entirely unrelated to the task being performed (e.g., studying).
The question as to whether any task-irrelevant stimuli can nev-
ertheless attract and distract attention has in fact been the focus of
a contentious debate for some time, triggering the development of
another widely used class of distraction measure: the Attentional
Capture Paradigm (see Figure 1B for example). Using variants of
this task, reaction time (RT) interference has been demonstrated
in the presence (versus absence) of certain types of distractor,
such as salient feature singletons (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991a, 1992)
and abrupt onsets (e.g., Remington et al., 1992), even when these
are response-irrelevant and visually distinct from the target stim-
uli. However, proponents of “contingent capture” have challenged
studies purporting to show attentional capture from irrelevant
stimuli, highlighting that even apparently task-irrelevant distrac-
tors may in fact be relevant to attentional settings for the task
(e.g., Folk et al., 1992, 2002), and moreover, their ability to inter-
fere may depend on this task-relevance. For example, interference
from singleton distractors may be contingent on their relevance
to a “singleton detection” search strategy adopted when the search
target is also a singleton (even in a different dimension – e.g., color
versus form; Bacon and Egeth, 1994). Task-relevance may also be
conferred by more general aspects of the stimulus display: Gibson
and Kelsey (1998) have argued, for example, that any task involv-
ing an onset of the stimulus display at the start of each trial may
create “display-wide” attentional settings for abrupt onset stimuli,
including distractors.
In addition, studies designed to demonstrate distraction by
stimuli irrelevant to any attentional settings have primarily used
search tasks in which the distractors appear in task-relevant loca-
tions, in or around potential target locations. As the specific target
location is typically unknown, participants would be likely to
allocate their attention diffusely across the entire display, includ-
ing the locations in which the distractors were to appear. In the
light of previous evidence suggesting that distractor effects can be
eliminated with prior knowledge of location (Yantis and Jonides,
1990; Theeuwes, 1991b), it seems likely that location-relevance
contributes to the distractor interference measured by such para-
digms. A smaller number of studies (Christ and Abrams, 2006; Neo
and Chua, 2006) have demonstrated attentional capture by abrupt
onsets within paradigms in which the target location is known.
However, even in these cases the location was not in fact entirely
irrelevant – distractors and other non-targets were perceptually
grouped with the target around fixation, which would have made
them harder to ignore (see Driver and Baylis, 1989; Kramer and
Jacobson, 1991).
IRRELEVANT DISTRACTION: EXTERNAL SOURCES
The studies reviewed above highlight that in order to be considered
entirely task-irrelevant, distractors must be unrelated to any task
responses, presented in an irrelevant location, visually dissimilar
from the search stimuli and irrelevant to any attentional settings
for the current task. A recent series of studies by Forster and
Lavie (2008a,b, 2011) (see Figure 1C) introduced a new measure
designed to meet these criteria. These studies have demonstrated
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robust RT slowing in the presence, versus absence, of a colorful
distractor image (e.g., of the cartoon character Spiderman) across
two different task types: a letter search (Forster and Lavie, 2008a,b)
and a sequential forced-choice response task (Forster and Lavie,
2011; Figure 2). Irrelevant distractor interference has been found
for meaningless (a colorful shape) and frequently presented (50%
trials) stimuli, but was greater for semantically meaningful (e.g.,
a famous cartoon character) and infrequently presented (10% tri-
als) stimuli (Forster and Lavie, 2008b, see also Biggs et al., 2012
for further examination of effects of meaningfulness on irrelevant
distraction).
Note that in these studies, the complex and colorful distractor
stimuli bore no visual similarity to the task stimuli (gray letters
or digits), appeared in an irrelevant peripheral location, and were
unrelated in content to any aspect of the task being performed.
Although the distractor was a type of singleton (being the only
stimulus of its kind in the display), the interference does not appear
to depend on a use of a singleton detection search strategy as it per-
sists even when such a strategy is unavailable (using a search set size
of three; Forster and Lavie, 2008a,b). In addition, the brief onset
of the irrelevant distractor during a novel sequential response task
(see Figure 2) produced RTs slowing of up to three responses
following its presentation. As the display in this task remained
constant over multiple (9 or 36) responses, such interference can-
not be attributed to attentional settings associated with onset of,
or other dynamic changes to, the task stimuli. Thus, as in daily life,
the distractors in these studies appear to interfere despite being
entirely task-irrelevant.
Forster and Lavie (2008a) recently clarified that although inter-
ference from these salient and meaningful abrupt onset distractors
persists in the absence of any task-relevance, it can be modulated by
perceptual task-load. This study employed a widely used manipu-
lation of load with a letter search task, whereby a letter search target
is presented among non-targets that are either visually dissimilar
(e.g., small circles, low load, see Figure 1C) or similar (e.g., other
angular letters, high load) to the target. I note that this manipula-
tion of load within response-competition tasks has recently been
argued to reduce interference not via load, but via low level “dilu-
tion” effects whereby feature representations of the visually similar
non-targets degrade the distractor representation (e.g., Tsal and
Benoni, 2010; Wilson et al., 2011). Unlike response-competition
letter distractors, however, the irrelevant distractors have very min-
imal feature overlap with the non-target stimuli in either the high
or low load conditions. It appears less plausible that the inclusion
of small, monochromatic letters (versus small, monochromatic
circles) in the display would substantially degrade the represen-
tation of a larger, colorful cartoon image. Thus, the finding that
the robust irrelevant distractor interference seen under low load
can be reduced to non-significant levels under high load provides
compelling evidence in support of the perceptual load hypothesis.
IRRELEVANT DISTRACTION: INTERNAL SOURCES
In daily life sources of distraction may not only be found in the
external environment, but also in the form of internally generated
distractions such as task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). Studies of
mind-wandering suggest that this may be a highly disruptive form
of distraction: increased reports of TUTs have been associated with
impaired performance on a wide range of tasks from simple signal
detection to more complex tasks such reading comprehension, lis-
tening to lectures, SAT examinations, and driving (Schooler et al.,
FIGURE 2 | A continuous task designed to preclude general
attentional settings associated with the onset of the display. (A)
Example stimulus display: participants make sequential responses,
working from left to right, top to bottom, indicating whether each item in
the display is a letter or a digit. The display remains onscreen throughout
the response sequence. The distractor appears briefly during a minority of
displays, and never co-occurs with the responses immediately following
the display onset. (B) Despite being entirely irrelevant to the task in terms
of visual appearance, meaning, location, and any attentional settings, the
brief presentation of a distractor produces significant RT slowing for the
response immediately following its presentation (lag 0), and for the two
subsequent responses (lags 1 and 2).
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2004; Smallwood et al., 2007; He et al., 2011; Risko et al., 2012;
Unsworth et al., 2012).
Despite its apparent ubiquity in daily life, irrelevant distraction
from task-unrelated mind-wandering has been largely neglected
by studies of selective attention – perhaps due to the inherent diffi-
culty in directly measuring such a subjective phenomenon. How-
ever, the growing literature on mind-wandering has established
a number of measures, such as diary-keeping, questionnaires,
or intermittent “thought-probing” during a task (see Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006, for review), and recent individual differences
research using these measures suggests that distraction from mind-
wandering and external stimuli may be driven, at least in part, by
common mechanisms. Kane and colleagues have argued that the
ability to exert attentional control over mind-wandering draws on
an executive control mechanism (e.g., McVay and Kane, 2010),
which also supports attentional control over external stimuli (e.g.,
during Stroop or response-competition tasks, Kane and Engle,
2003; Levinson et al., 2012; Shipstead et al., 2012). In support
of this claim, lower executive WMC has been linked to increased
mind-wandering (e.g., Kane et al., 2007; McVay and Kane, 2009).
Consistent with the notion of a role of WMC in avoiding distrac-
tion from mind-wandering, this relationship has been found to
be strongest during tasks that participants classified as requiring
concentration (Kane et al., 2007).
A more direct link between internal and external forms of
distraction was made in a recent study (Forster and Lavie,
2013) examining the relation between individual differences
in mind-wandering and two measures of external distraction:
response-competition interference, and our recently established
measure of entirely irrelevant distraction (as described above;
Forster and Lavie, 2008a,b). In two experiments, individuals who
reported higher levels of daily life mind-wandering also showed
increased RT interference from task-irrelevant external distrac-
tors. However, this study highlighted that not all forms of dis-
traction are alike: mind-wandering was not related to response-
competition interference in either experiment. Moreover, inter-
ference from response-competition letter distractors was unre-
lated to our measure of task-irrelevant distractor interference.
Thus, this study suggests a common trait specifically underly-
ing the ability to ignore entirely irrelevant stimuli, regardless of
whether these are internal (i.e., TUTs) or external, while also
highlighting the importance of task-relevance in determining
distraction.
An interesting question is whether, in addition to (in some
cases) drawing on a common trait, internal, and external forms
of distraction also share the common determinant of perceptual
load. Recent studies (Forster and Lavie, 2009; Levinson et al., 2012)
have examined this issue: during a letter search task with high and
low perceptual load, participants were intermittently probed as to
whether their current thought was task-related or task-unrelated.
In keeping with the well established effects on external distraction,
reports of TUTs were reduced with the increase in perceptual load.
Moreover, one experiment incorporating both thought probes and
response-competition distractors (Forster and Lavie, 2009, Exper-
iment 4) demonstrated that the extent of load effects on these two
forms of distraction was correlated between individuals. Thus,
both internal and external forms of distraction appear subject to
modulation by a common mechanism, depending on the level of
perceptual load in the current task.
I note that the substantial qualitative differences between
response-competition distractors and TUTs make it somewhat
implausible that this common mechanism involves low level“dilu-
tion” of both types of distractor representation by the letter non-
targets: indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which
the representation of a TUT (e.g., involving salient current con-
cern, Smallwood and Schooler, 2006) would be diluted simply by
the presence of five externally presented monochromatic letters.
Rather, the results of this study appear in line with the sugges-
tion that when perceptual capacity is exhausted by task demands,
vulnerability to interference from potential distractors is reduced
regardless of whether these are internal or external.
HOW UNIVERSAL ARE PERCEPTUAL LOAD EFFECTS ON
DISTRACTION?
Perceptual load is well established to modulate interference from
response-competition distractors, whether these are presented in
irrelevant peripheral locations (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie and Cox,
1997), or fixation (Beck and Lavie, 2005); and whether these are
simple letters as per the traditional response-competition task,
or meaningful images (Lavie et al., 2003). The studies described
above extend Load Theory to forms of distraction (both inter-
nal and external) which produce robust interference despite their
irrelevance to the current task. The common effect of perceptual
load on mind-wandering and response-competition interference
is particularly striking given that these two forms of distraction do
not appear to be directly correlated with each other (Forster and
Lavie, 2009, 2013). This suggests that load effects may be universal
across distractor types, regardless of their task-relevance or their
relation to each other. Indeed, neuro-imaging findings suggest that
perceptual load can also reduce processing even of potentially bio-
logically important yet irrelevant stimuli, such as the amygdala
response to threat (Bishop et al., 2007) and motion processing
in V5 (Rees et al., 1997), as well as behavioral interference from
moving or abrupt onset distractors (Cosman and Vecera, 2009,
2010).
Interestingly, the one potential exception to perceptual load
effects appears to be distractor stimuli with which partici-
pants have a high degree of familiarity or expertise: response-
competition interference from famous faces and musical instru-
ments among musicians (but not non-musicians), as well as inter-
ference from task-irrelevant national flags or sports team logos,
has been found to persist under high perceptual load (Lavie et al.,
2003; Ro et al., 2009; Biggs et al., 2012). Thus, when stimuli have
a high degree of personal relevance, they may be prioritized for
processing regardless of perceptual load or task-relevance.
Perceptual load effects also appear to be largely universal across
individuals, with one important exception: as load effects depend
on capacity limits, individual differences in perceptual capacity
(e.g., those associated with age, Maylor and Lavie, 1998; Huang-
Pollock et al., 2002; video game expertise, Green and Bavelier, 2003;
or conditions such as autism or congenital deafness, Proksch and
Bavelier, 2002; Remington et al., 2009) lead to differences in the
level of load required to reduce distraction. However, factors pre-
dicting vulnerability to distraction, such as self-reported daily life
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attentional failures, trait anxiety, and WMC, have been found to
do so only during tasks with low load, and not high load (Bishop
et al., 2007; Forster and Lavie, 2007; Bishop, 2009; Levinson et al.,
2012).
CONCLUSIONS
The findings discussed here highlight the importance of consid-
ering the role of task-relevance in distraction. Although certain
forms of distraction may be contingent on their task-relevance,
studies using new measures demonstrate that task-relevance is
not a necessary condition for distraction. Rather, as in daily
life, sources of distraction may be entirely task-irrelevant, and
may also include both external stimuli and task-unrelated mind-
wandering. It is unclear to what extent these common, yet
understudied, forms of distraction are directly related to other
laboratory measures such as the response-competition task. How-
ever, perceptual load appears a powerful and largely universal
determinant of distraction, across both existing measures and
new measures of irrelevant distraction (both internal and exter-
nal), as well as across individuals. Thus, Load Theory provides
a useful framework for predicting when a variety of forms
of daily life distraction are most likely to occur (i.e., during
tasks with low perceptual complexity and demands) and even
for interventions to prevent this (e.g., by increasing perceptual
complexity).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Nilli Lavie for her valuable feedback on this man-
uscript. This work was supported by an ESRC post-doctoral
fellowship.
REFERENCES
Arthur, W., and Doverspike, D. (1992).
Locus of control and auditory selec-
tive attention as predictors of dri-
ving accident involvement – a com-
parative longitudinal investigation.
J. Safety Res. 23, 73–80.
Bacon, W. F., and Egeth, H. E. (1994).
Overriding stimulus-driven atten-
tional capture. Percept. Psychophys.
55, 485–496.
Biggs, A. T., Kreager, R. D., Gibson,
B. S., Villano, M., and Crowell,
C. R. (2012). Semantic and affec-
tive salience: the role of meaning
and preference in attentional cap-
ture and disengagement. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 38,
531–541.
Bishop, S. J. (2009). Trait anxiety and
impoverished prefrontal control of
attention. Nat. Neurosci. 12, 92–98.
Bishop, S. J., Jenkins, R., and Lawrence,
A. (2007). The neural processing of
task-irrelevant fearful faces: effects
of perceptual load and individual
differences in trait and state anxiety.
Cereb. Cortex 17, 1595–1603.
Cartwright-Finch, U., and Lavie, N.
(2007). The role of perceptual load
in inattentional blindness. Cognition
102, 321–340.
Christ, S. E., and Abrams, R. A. (2006).
Abrupt onsets cannot be ignored.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 13, 875–880.
Cosman, J. D., and Vecera, S. P. (2009).
Perceptual load modulates atten-
tional capture by abrupt onsets. Psy-
chon. Bull. Rev. 16, 404–410.
Cosman, J. D., and Vecera, S. P. (2010).
Attentional capture by motion
onsets is modulated by perceptual
load. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 72,
2096–2105.
Driver, J., and Baylis, G. C. (1989).
Movement and visual-attention –
the spotlight metaphor breaks down.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form. 15, 448–456.
Eriksen, B. A., and Eriksen, C. W. (1974).
Effects of noise letters upon identi-
fication of a target letter in a non-
search task. Percept. Psychophys. 16,
143–149.
Folk, C. L., Leber, A. B., and Egeth, H.
E. (2002). Made you blink! Contin-
gent attentional capture produces a
spatial blink. Percept. Psychophys. 64,
741–753.
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., and
Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary
covert orienting is contingent on
attentional control settings. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 18,
1030–1044.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2007). High
perceptual load makes everybody
equal – eliminating individual dif-
ferences in distractibility with load.
Psychol. Sci. 18, 377–381.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2008a). Fail-
ures to ignore entirely irrelevant dis-
tractors: the role of load. J. Exp.
Psychol. Appl. 14, 73–83.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2008b). Atten-
tional capture by entirely irrelevant
distractors. Vis. Cogn. 16, 200–214.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2009). Har-
nessing the wandering mind: the role
of perceptual load. Cognition 111,
345–355.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2011). Entirely
irrelevant distractors can capture
and captivate attention. Psychon.
Bull. Rev. 18, 1064–1070.
Forster, S., and Lavie, N. (2013). Dis-
tracted by your mind? Individual
differences in distractibility predict
mind wandering. J. Exp. Psychol.
Learn. Mem. Cogn.
Gibson, B. S., and Kelsey, E. M. (1998).
Stimulus-driven attentional capture
is contingent on attentional set for
displaywide visual features. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 24,
699–706.
Green, C., and Bavelier, D. (2003).
Action video game modifies visual
selective attention. Nature 423,
534–537.
He, J., Becic, E., Lee,Y. C., and McCarley,
J. S. (2011). Mind wandering behind
the wheel: performance and oculo-
motor correlates. Hum. Factors 53,
13–21.
Huang-Pollock, C. L., Carr, T. H., and
Nigg, J. T. (2002). Development of
selective attention: perceptual load
influences early versus late atten-
tional selection in children and
adults. Dev. Psychol. 38, 363–375.
Kane, M. J., Brown, L. H., McVay, J.
C., Silvia, P. J., Myin-Germeys, I.,
and Kwapil, T. R. (2007). For whom
the mind wanders, and when: an
experience sampling study of work-
ing memory and executive control
in everyday life. Psychol. Sci. 18,
614–621.
Kane, M. J., and Engle, R. W. (2003).
Working-memory capacity and the
control of attention: the contribu-
tions of goal neglect, response com-
petition, and task set to Stroop inter-
ference. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 132,
47–70.
Kramer, A. F., and Jacobson, A. (1991).
Perceptual organization and focused
attention – the role of objects and
proximity in visual processing. Per-
cept. Psychophys. 50, 267–284.
Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as
a necessary condition for selective
attention. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Per-
cept. Perform. 21, 451–468.
Lavie, N. (2005). Distracted and con-
fused? Selective attention under
load. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.)
9, 75–82.
Lavie, N. (2010). Attention, distraction,
and cognitive control under load.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 19, 143–148.
Lavie, N., and Cox, S. (1997). On the
efficiency of visual selective atten-
tion: efficient visual search leads to
inefficient distractor rejection. Psy-
chol. Sci. 8, 395–398.
Lavie, N., and Fox, E. (2000). The role
of perceptual load in negative prim-
ing. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 26, 1038–1052.
Lavie, N., Ro, T., and Russell, C. (2003).
The role of perceptual load in pro-
cessing distractor faces. Psychol. Sci.
14, 510–515.
Levinson, D. B., Smallwood, J., and
Davidson, R. J. (2012). The persis-
tence of thought: evidence for a role
of working memory in the main-
tenance of task-unrelated thinking.
Psychol. Sci. 23, 375–380.
Maylor, E. A., and Lavie, N. (1998).
The influence of perceptual load on
age differences in selective attention.
Psychol. Aging 13, 563–573.
McVay, J. C., and Kane, M. J. (2009).
Conducting the train of thought:
working memory capacity, goal
neglect, and mind wandering in an
executive-control task. J. Exp. Psy-
chol. Learn.Mem.Cogn. 35, 196–204.
McVay, J. C., and Kane, M. J. (2010).
Does mind-wandering reflect exec-
utive function or executive fail-
ure? comment on Smallwood and
Schooler (2006) and Watkins (2008).
Psychol. Bull. 136, 188–197.
Neo, G., and Chua, F. K. (2006). Captur-
ing focused attention. Percept. Psy-
chophys. 68, 1286–1296.
Proksch, J., and Bavelier, D. (2002).
Changes in the spatial distribution of
visual attention after early deafness.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 687–701.
Rabiner, D. L., Murray, D. W., Schmid,
L., and Malone, P. S. (2004).
An exploration of the relation-
ship between ethnicity, attention
problems, and academic achieve-
ment. School Psychol. Rev. 33,
498–509.
Rees, G., Frith, C. D., and Lavie,
N. (1997). Modulating irrelevant
motion perception by varying atten-
tional load in an unrelated task.
Science 278, 1616–1619.
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 283 | 5
Forster Distraction and mind-wandering under load
Remington, A., Swettenham, J., Camp-
bell, R., and Coleman, M. (2009).
Selective attention and perceptual
load in autism spectrum disorder.
Psychol. Sci. 20, 1388–1393.
Remington, R. W., Johnston, J. C., and
Yantis, S. (1992). Involuntary atten-
tional capture by abrupt onsets. Per-
cept. Psychophys. 51, 279–290.
Risko, E. F., Anderson, N., Sarwal, A.,
Engelhardt, M., and Kingstone, A.
(2012). Everyday attention: varia-
tion in mind wandering and mem-
ory in a lecture. Appl. Cogn. Psychol.
26, 234–242.
Ro, T., Friggel, A., and Lavie, N.
(2009). Musical expertise modu-
lates the effects of visual perceptual
load. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 71,
671–674.
Schooler, J. W., Reichle, E. D., and
Halpern, D. V. (2004). “Zoning
out while reading: evidence for
dissociations between experience
and metaconsciousness,” in Think-
ing and Seeing: Visual Metacognition
in Adults and Children, ed. D. T.
Levin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
203–226.
Schwartz, S., Vuilleumier, P., Hutton,
C., Maravita, A., Dolan, R. J.,
and Driver, J. (2005). Attentional
load and sensory competition in
human vision: modulation of fMRI
responses by load at fixation dur-
ing task-irrelevant stimulation in the
peripheral visual field. Cereb. Cortex
15, 770–786.
Shipstead, Z., Harrison, T. L., and Engle,
R. W. (2012). Working memory
capacity and visual attention: top-
down and bottom-up guidance. Q.
J. Exp. Psychol. (Hove) 65, 401–407.
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., and
Schooler, J. W. (2007). The lights
are on but no one’s home: meta-
awareness and the decoupling of
attention when the mind wanders.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14, 527–533.
Smallwood, J., and Schooler, J. W.
(2006). The restless mind. Psychol.
Bull. 132, 946–958.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interfer-
ence in serial verbal reactions. J. Exp.
Psychol. 12, 643–662.
Theeuwes, J. (1991a). Cross-
dimensional perceptual selectivity.
Percept. Psychophys. 50, 184–193.
Theeuwes, J. (1991b). Exogenous and
endogenous control of attention –
the effect of visual onsets and offsets.
Percept. Psychophys. 49, 83–90.
Theeuwes, J. (1992). Perceptual selec-
tivity for color and form. Percept.
Psychophys. 51, 599–606.
Tsal, Y., and Benoni, H. (2010). Diluting
the burden of load: perceptual load
effects are simply dilution effects. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
36, 1645–1656.
Tsal, Y., and Makovski, T. (2006). The
attentional white bear phenomenon:
the mandatory allocation of atten-
tion to expected distractor locations.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Per-
form. 32, 351–363.
Unsworth, N., Brewer, G. A., and
Spillers, G. J. (2012). Variation in
cognitive failures: an individual dif-
ferences investigation of everyday
attention and memory failures. J.
Mem. Lang. 67, 1–16.
Wallace, J. C., and Vodanovich, S. J.
(2003). Can accidents and indus-
trial mishaps be predicted? Fur-
ther investigation into the relation-
ship between cognitive failure and
reports of accidents. J. Bus. Psychol.
17, 503–514.
Wilson, D. E., MacLeod, C. M., and
Muroi, M. (2011). Dilution, not
load, affects distractor processing. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
37, 319–335.
Yantis, S. (2000). “Goal-directed and
stimulus-driven determinants of
attentional control,” inAttention and
Performance, Vol. 18, ed. S. Mon-
sell (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
73–103.
Yantis, S., and Jonides, J. (1990).
Abrupt visual onsets and selective
attention – voluntary versus auto-
matic allocation. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 16, 121–134.
Yi, D. J., Woodman, G. F., Wid-
ders, D., Marois, R. and Chun, M.
M. (2004). Neural fate of ignored
stimuli: dissociable effects of percep-
tual and working memory load. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 992–996.
Young, A. W., Ellis, A. W., Flude, B.
M., McWeeny, K. H., and Hay, D.
C. (1986). Face name interference. J.
Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform.
12, 466–475.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that
could be construed as a potential con-
flict of interest.
Received: 09 February 2013; accepted:
03 May 2013; published online: 22 May
2013.
Citation: Forster S (2013) Distrac-
tion and mind-wandering under
load. Front. Psychol. 4:283. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00283
This article was submitted to Frontiers
in Cognition, a specialty of Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Forster . This is an
open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion License, which permits use, distrib-
ution and reproduction in other forums,
provided the original authors and source
are credited and subject to any copy-
right notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 283 | 6
